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INTRODUCTION 
In modern economies, prices are 
determined through market forces , 
administrative authority, (through 
the actions of governments or 
oligopolistic firms) , or both. Since 
the time of Adam Smith it has been 
recognized that prices determined 
within a competitive equilibrium 
lead to efficient resource allocation 
and optimum welfare levels. The ap-
peal of Smith's invisible hand stems 
from the fact that individuals not on-
ly can but ought to pursue their 
selfish interests. In so doing, they 
will actually end up acting in the 
best interest of society. As a cor-
ollary, it is argued that the prices 
determined in this competitive set-
ting are appropriate. Economists fre-
quently suggest that the right price 
is one which is consistent with prin-
ciples derived from the general 
equilibrium of an idealized 
economy. 
One implication of these notions 
is that prices should be determined 
by the market. However, market 
prices can be considered optimal on-
ly if certain conditions are met. The 
existence of monopolies, externalities 
and public goods, for example, 
results in a misallocation of resources 
if price determination is left to the 
market. These "market failures" 
have frequently been offered as ra-
tionales for state intervention in 
markets. Even if a market conforms 
to the perfectly competitive model, 
the competitive equilibrium prices 
will vary with changes in the 
distribution of income, wealth, and 
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property rights. Different sets of 
relative prices will be determined by 
competitive markets that are in-
stituted differently. There is no 
economic criterion to assist in choos-
ing among the possible price sets. 
Prices determined by market forces, 
thus, are no less arbitrary than prices 
set as a result of administrative deci-
sions by government agencies or 
large private firms. 
Government market intervention 
is extensive in the United States and 
most other countries. Presumably, 
state intervention is aimed at con-
trolling the actions of monopolistic 
or oligopolistic firms, correcting 
market failures , or altering the 
distribution of income or wealth 
within society. Conceptually, there 
is little to guide government 
policymakers in setting these ad-
ministered prices. Price levels incon-
sistent with supply and demand con-
ditions will lead to surpluses or short-
ages. This acts as a constraint on the 
decisions of price administrators but 
generally will only serve to set fairly 
vague upper and lower bounds on 
the chosen price level. Within these 
bounds there is room for maneuver 
with the result that decisions are sub-
ject to political influence. The 
political aspect of administered 
prices is present whether prices are 
set by government authority or large 
private firms. 
Agricultural prices provide an in-
teresting example of the interplay 
between politics and markets. The 
levels at which prices for agricultural 
products would settle if markets 
were essentially left alone are 
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generally considered to be too low or 
unstable. In all industrialized coun-
tries, governments intervene in 
agricultural markets to stabilize 
prices or prevent them from falling 
to the competitive market level. In 
many developing countries and oc-
casionally in industrialized nations, 
there is also intervention to prevent 
consumer food prices from rising too 
high. In either case, the judgment 
that prices are too high or too low is 
essentially political. Various in-
struments have been developed to 
translate this political judgment in-
to a constraint on market prices. In 
the United States loan rates for many 
crops insure that market prices will 
at least be equal to a certain 
minimum. Where prices finally set-
tle, at or above this minimum, is 
largely left to the market. 
Although agricultural support 
prices have primarily been the pro-
duct of political processes, there have 
been many efforts to introduce "ob-
jective" criteria into the decision pro-
cess. These efforts can be seen as at-
tempts to remove the politics from 
the administrative decision on price 
supports. Formulas based on parity 
prices, cost of production, average 
market prices, world prices, or some 
other notion appear fair and objec-
tive. It should be noted, however, 
that the pricing rule embodied in 
these criteria is itself the product of 
political decision. No single formula 
represents the one, true method to 
objectively determine fair prices. 
The type of formula used to set sup-
port prices depends largely on the 
relative importance of goals such as 
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higher farm income or export 
promotion. 
The purpose of this report is to ex-
amine some common methods for 
setting policy prices and discuss the 
implications of some current pro-
posals for determining U. S. price 
and income supports. In Part I, 
various methods used to determine 
government -administered agricul-
tural prices are reviewed. The 
primary focus is the evolution of 
pricing concepts in the United States, 
including a discussion of the debate 
on using average costs of production 
to set policy prices (loan rates and 
target prices). A brief discussion of 
experience with government policy 
prices in other industrialized coun-
tries is also presented. Part II is 
devoted to an examination of the im-
plications of using alternative pric-
ing rules or formulas for establishing 
loan rates and target prices in the 
United States. 
PART I: REVIEW OF 
METHODS USED TO SET 
ADMINISTERED 
AGRICULTURAL PRICES 
Introduction and 
Historical Background 
Current U.S. policy on cereal 
grains and cotton includes two policy 
prices. The loan rate serves as a price 
floor and helps smooth seasonal price 
variation. The target price is a sub-
sidized price received by producers 
participating in government pro-
grams. It is generally higher than the 
market price and serves to support 
farm incomes. Prior to 1973, the 
loan rate was used to support farm 
incomes and there were pressures to 
set it at levels inconsistent with 
domestic and world demand. This 
situation is illustrated in Figure 1, 
where the loan rate (LR) has been set 
above the free market equilibrium. 
At this level of price support, pro-
ducers supply quantity Q2, while 
consumers are only willing to pur-
chase quantity Q I. The difference 
between Q2 and QI is the amount the 
government "purchases" and stores 
to support market prices at LR. 
The introduction of target prices 
allowed the government to lower 
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loan rates and has resulted in lower 
consumer prices. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2. The target price (TP) is 
set at a level consistent with the ob-
jective of supporting farm income. 
Since this is the price producers ef-
fectively receive, they will supply the 
quantity Qo. The price paid by con-
sumers is allowed to fall to Po which 
will clear the market when Qo is sup-
plied. The difference between the 
target price and market price Po is 
paid directly to farmers in the form 
of a deficiency payment. This system 
results in two prices for the product, 
one paid by consumers, and a higher 
one received by farmers. The defi-
ciency payment is a subsidy paid by 
the government to increase the price 
received by producers. In Figure 2, 
the loan rate has been set below Po. 
In this situation, its purpose is to pre-
vent market prices from falling 
below the loan rate at harvest when 
the large quantities supplied would 
normally depress market prices. In 
this example, the market is allowed 
to clear so no surplus is stored by the 
government. 
A fundamental objective of U.S. 
farm policy has been to keep farmers' 
incomes from falling behind incomes 
received by workers in other sectors 
of the economy. Direct income 
transfers have not generally been 
used to achieve this objective. 
Instead, the prices received for the 
major farm products have been 
raised to levels where it is hoped that 
the resulting income would be equiv-
alent to that in the rest of the 
economy. In the 1920's, farm prices 
were much lower than in earlier 
periods and farm incomes began to 
fall significantly behind industrial 
incomes (Holland, 1977). This led 
farm groups to call for parity, a con-
cept which played an important 
historical role in setting policy prices. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 was the first major farm bill. 
Although the parity concept was not 
explicitly mentioned in the act, the 
Secretary of Agriculture was charged 
with maintaining the purchasing 
power of the farm sector (Holland, 
1977). In the 1938 farm bill, the 
word "parity" was used for the first 
time and a formula was constructed 
to determine parity prices as equal 
to the average price received during 
the 1910-14 base period multiplied 
by the current index of prices paid. 
This provided a commodity with th r 
same purchasing power as i 
1910-14. In subsequent farm legisla-
tion, this formula was modified and 
after 1948 the base period price was 
replaced by the most recent 10-year 
average of prices paid (Holland, 
1977). For the most part, reference 
to parity has been dropped in recent 
agricultural legislation. 
Another parity measure is the 
parity ratio defined as the index of 
prices received by farmers divided by 
an index of prices paid by farmers. 
Both of these indices are weighted 
averages with the weights period-
ically updated on the basis of survey 
information. The parity ratio and 
parity prices were assumed to in-
dicate the economic well-being of 
the farm population (Holland, 
1977). However, since they are based 
on prices rather than income, they 
are only partly related to the main 
objectives of agricultural policy. 
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's 
parity prices would have been much 
higher than the actual market prices 
received by farmers. Yet, many 
larger farms realized relatively high 
returns at these market prices. Some 
farms would have received insuffi-
cient income even if they had received 
the parity price (Brandow, 1977). 
A major problem with the parity 
concept is that it does not take 
technological change into account. 
Many argue that a bushel of corn 
should command the same real 
revenue today. In addition, holding 
relative prices at a constant level 
over time inhibits the resource 
allocation role that prices are sup-
posed to play in a market economy. 
Other problems with the parity con-
cept include: regional differences in 
cost and price increases; the fact that 
the weighted averages used in 
calculating indices may lead to high 
returns for. larger, more efficient 
farms while leaving other farms with 
very low returns; the tendency for 
the developement of a price spiral as 
products such as corn are counted in 
both the index of prices received and 
the index of prices paid; and the fact 
that parity is not commodity specifi 
(Holland, 1977). 
In general, price supports have 
not been set at 100 percent of the 
parity price. Brandow (1977) notes 
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that most economists have not 
favored fixed percentages of parity 
as a policy goal. Instead, they view 
flexible parity percentages, moving 
averages, administrative discretion, 
and other approaches to setting sup-
port prices as preferable. It had 
become apparent in the 1960's that 
loan rates set in relation to parity 
reduced the ability of the United 
States to export. High inflation in the 
1970's led to high parity prices. Be-
tween 1974 and 1981 the support 
price for corn averaged around 50 
percent of the parity price (USDA, 
1982). In this context, the parity con-
cept came under attack and the idea 
of basing policy prices on costs of 
production was suggested as an 
alternative. 
The Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection Act of 1973 represented a 
transition from primary reliance on 
parity to determine support prices 
toward using costs of production. At 
the time this legislation was adopted, 
some felt the traditional problem of 
excess capacity in agriculture was no 
longer relevant as the world moved 
into a situation of resource scarcity. 
Less emphasis was placed on limiting 
production. The major policy in-
novation was the use of target price 
and deficiency payments with the 
loan rate set below market levels to 
act as a floor price. Parity was still 
used for setting some loan rates but 
there were many discretionary 
aspects (minimum loan rate levels) 
and other considerations (such as 
average market prices) were taken 
into account. For cotton the loan 
rate was set in relation to world 
prices for American cotton with no 
reference to parity (Rasmussen 'and 
Baker, 1979). Target prices were set 
for 1975 and a formula was in-
troduced to adjust these prices for 
the 1976-77 crop years. The ad-
justments were based on changes in 
USDA's index of prices paid for pro-
duction items, interest, taxes, and 
wage rates (PI) and changes in a 3-
year moving average of crop yields 
(Y). Letting TP represent the target 
price, the formula used for adjust-
ment in year tis: 
1) TPt = TPt-1 (1 + dPI - dY) 
with the provision that TP cannot be 
less than TPt-1 (Penn and Brown, 
1977). This formula represents an ef-
fort to . incorporate technological 
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change into the calculation of target 
prices. 
The 1973 Act also included in-
structions to USDA to initiate studies 
of the average costs of production for 
major commodities. Although there 
was no provision for using this infor-
mation to set policy prices, the act 
prepared the way for the use of this 
concept in subsequent legislation 
(Sharples and Krenz, 1977). In the 
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, 
target prices for wheat and feed 
grains were set for 1977-78 and a for-
mula was used for adjusting these 
prices for the 1979 to 1981 crop 
years. This formula was based on a 
2-year average of production costs 
including expenditures for interest, 
insurance, replacement of machin-
ery, general overhead, and direct 
production outlays. It did not allow 
target prices to be lowered as yields 
increased. A return to land and 
management was used in setting the 
initial target prices in 1977 and 1978 
but was excluded from the adjust-
ment formula (Rasm ussen and 
Baker, 1979; Johnson, 1982). Loan 
rate levels were set at the discretion 
of the Secretary of Agriculture 
although minimum levels were 
specified. For cotton, a procedure 
similar to that for wheat and feed 
grains was used to set target prices, 
but loan rates were determined as 
the lesser of 85 percent of average 
market prices; or 90 percent of world 
market price. The cost of production 
concept was used to adjust target 
prices for rice although parity was 
retained in setting milk price sup-
ports (Rasmussen and Baker, 1979). 
In general, the 1977 Act represented 
a movement toward greater reliance 
on costs of production in setting 
target prices. On the other hand, 
loan rates were set largely through 
administrative discretion constrained 
by a variety of rules and legislated 
minima. 
The 1981 Act reveals a tendency 
to move away from the strict ap-
plication of formulas in setting 
prices. Minimum target prices were 
set for wheat, feed grains, cotton and 
rice for the 1982-85 crop years. The 
Secretary of Agriculture can set 
higher target prices using the cost of 
production per acre as a guide. In 
the previous law the formula was 
based on the cost of production per 
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unit of output. Per acre cost of pro-
duction does not take changing pro-
ductivity into account (Hargrove, 
1982). The 1981 Act also specifies 
minimum loan rates for wheat and 
feed grains leaving some discretion 
to the Secretary of Agriculture to set 
them above these minima. The for-
mula used to set cotton loan rates 
was slightly modified but retains the 
reference to world prices established 
in earlier legislation. The rice loan 
rate is set by changing the support 
price of the previous year by the 
same percentage as the target price 
adjustment. The soybean loan rate 
is set as 75 percent of the average 
price received by farmers in 3 of the 
previous 5 years, the highest and 
lowest prices being eliminated 
(Hargrove, 1982). Minimum loan 
rates for cotton and soybeans were 
established to prevent them from 
falling below politically acceptable 
levels. The Secretary of Agriculture 
was given some discretionary 
authority to reduce loan rates for 
cotton, wheat, and feed grains if 
stocks began to build up. 
The Debate on Cost of Production 
Sharples and Krenz (1977), and 
Martin (1977) addressed the issue of 
replacing parity with costs of pro-
duction prior to the 1977 farm bill 
debates. Sharples and Krenz (1977) 
note that the cost of production con-
cept reflects changes in output per 
unit of input as well as input price 
changes and, thus, represents an ad-
vance over parity which does not 
take productivity changes into ac-
count. However, they note that the 
use of average costs of production is 
not as straightforward as it might 
appear. There are three problems in 
the measurement of costs of 
production. 
1. Farm families provide much of 
the labor and management for 
the farm business and receive the 
difference between total cash 
receipts and total cash outlays as 
payment for a bundle of owned 
resources including family labor, 
land, and management skills. It 
is virtually impossible to 
determine how these returns 
should be allocated among these 
inputs. 
2. Land cost is another element dif-
ficult to calculate in determining 
costs of production. Many factors 
other than expected returns in-
fluence the price of land and any 
choice of method to compute the 
value of land is likely to be 
arbitrary. 
3. Production costs vary widely 
across regions and farm sizes 
(Sharples and Krenz, 1977). 
If the measurement problems can 
be overcome there is still a problem 
in tying administered prices to costs 
of production. If policy prices are 
high enough there will be an increase 
in land prices. If land is included in 
the cost of production calculation, 
the average cost of production will 
increase and administered prices 
linked to this average cost will have 
to be raised. Harris (1977) has 
developed a conceptual model of the 
relationship between price supports 
and land prices. In a numerical ex-
ample, he shows that the greater the 
proportion of land costs included in 
the calculation of support prices, the 
higher is the equilibrium price of 
land. If support price calculations in-
clude 70 percent or more of the land 
charges, Harris' example shows that 
price supports and land values spiral 
upward. To avoid this price spiral, 
land costs must be excluded or held 
constant over time (Sharples and 
Krenz, 1977). 
Martin (1977) notes the same ob-
jections to using costs of production 
in setting support prices. He in-
troduces a classification system to 
discuss different kinds of costs. Con-
tractual costs are associated with 
purchased inputs and may be 
avoidable (variable costs) or 
unavoidable (fixed costs). Noncon-
tractual costs are related to owned 
resources which are residual income 
claimants. If these noncontractual 
costs are included in the cost used to 
calculate the loan rate, it becomes 
possible for a price spiral to develop. 
Anything which increases product 
price will increase the return to the 
residual income claimants and this 
return is capitalized into their value. 
This will affect the price of these in-
puts and lead to a price spiral. Mar-
tin (1977) also discusses the cause of 
variations in costs of production in-
cluding differences in the rate of 
adoption of new technology across 
geographic regions, regional dif-
ferences in farm size, variations in 
managerial ability, and differences 
across the units for which costs are 
computed. 
Martin (1977) notes an additional 
problem with tying prices to costs of 
production. This type of formula 
pricing is based only on supply con-
siderations and does not include de-
mand conditions. Determining 
policy prices on the basis of produc-
tion costs alone could lead to devia-
tions between long-run equilibrium 
market prices and support levels. An 
example of this would be the loss of 
foreign markets if loan rates based on 
average costs of production were 
higher than world market prices. 
This would also apply to the parity 
notion. Other formulas based on 
average market prices or foreign 
market prices avoid this problem 
since these prices are the result of 
both supply and demand conditions. 
Martin (1977) argues that using some 
form of cost of production calcula-
tions would be an advance over the 
1973 target price adjustment for-
mula which was not commodity 
specific but suggests that decisions on 
computational method are crucial 
and difficult to base on economic 
criteria. 
Pasour (1980) criticizes the cost of 
production approach on the basis of 
both theoretical and measurement 
problems, concluding that " ... the 
use of cost data as a basis for 
agricultural price supports is 
'economically indefensible' re-
gardless of whether cost estimates are 
made at the firm or industry level." 
The basis of this argument is the ex-
istence of specialized resources in 
agricultural production. If a farm 
has a superior specialized resource 
such as highly productive land or ex-
ceptional management skills, the 
returns to this input will be capital-
ized into the value of that resource. 
When the returns to specialized 
resources are included in the costs, 
there will be a tendency for average 
costs to rise to the level of the prices. 
Pasour (1980) ~pggests that this situa-
tion makes it impossible to define 
average cost of production in-
dependently of demand. An increase 
in demand which leads to higher 
product prices will increase the 
returns to specialized factors and 
result in a rise in costs which include 
these factors. Supporting prices 
above the market level will have the 
same effect leading to a cost/price 
spiral. Pasour (1980) argues that 
these effects are present whether 
costs are calculated at the firm or in-
dustry level. 
Groenewegen and Clayton (1982) 
present a different view of the prob-
lem. They suggest that agricultural 
price supports should be seen as 
measures to control market in-
stabilities. As such, these supports 
should allow cash outlays to be 
covered but should not provide the 
opportunity cost of fixed resources to 
the owners of these resources. 
Groenewegen and Clayton (1982) 
argue that market prices should 
guide resource allocation while sup-
port prices should simply play the 
role of preventing unnecessary 
reallocation of resources when 
market prices are temporarily low. 
This argument allows them to sug-
gest that at least part of the returns 
to fixed resources be excluded from 
cost of production calculations. They 
suggest that costs are either pur-
chased factor costs or economic rent, 
the residual return to fixed resources. 
Both factor costs and economic rent 
may involve cash outlays during a 
production period. Some factor costs 
such as depreciation do not con-
stitute current cash expenditures. 
Since variable cash costs are easi-
ly observed and do not represent 
returns to fixed resources, they can 
be supported directly. In addition, 
however, the portion of economic 
rent and other fixed costs (interest, 
for example) which require cash 
outlays also needs to be supported. 
Since these fixed cash expenditures 
are largely determined by past 
discretionary income (Le., receipts 
less variable cost outlays), output 
price is an important determinant of 
these expenditures. Groenewegen 
and Clayton (1982) suggest that sup-
port prices can be set at the level of 
projected variable costs plus some 
percentage of the average receipts 
minus variable cost outlays. The for-
mula they propose is expressed as: 
-2) PSt = vci + K (P-VC) 
where PS is the price support level 
in t, VCP is the projected variable 
costs per unit of output, P is a mov-
ing average price per unit of output, 
VC is a similar moving average of 
variable costs, and K is a propor-
tionality constant to be determined. 
They suggest that a value of about 
0.5 might be reasonable for K. 
Groenewegen and Clayton (1982) 
believe the suggested formula will 
allow price supports to be set so as 
to prevent unnecessary adjustments 
while avoiding the cost price spiral 
resulting from a capitalization of the 
residual returns into land and other 
fixed resource costs. Belongia (1983) 
criticizes the suggestions of 
Groenewegen-and Clayton (1982) on 
two counts. First, he suggests that 
they represent an attempt to provide 
an objective economic basis for price 
supports. He argues that this is not 
possible since any price different 
from that determined within a com-
petitive equilibrium is necessarily ar-
bitrary. His second criticism rests on 
the notion that producer decisions 
are based on normally distributed 
price expectations. A price support 
truncates the distribution and leads 
necessarily to price expectations 
greater than those that would prevail 
if there were no price support. Since 
the expected price is increased by the 
support, derived demand for 
resources will be increased and their 
value will rise unless resource supply 
is perfectly elastic. He concludes that 
any formula leading to prices above 
market equilibrium levels will result 
in continually increasing resource 
values. 
Pasour (1983) also criticizes the 
Groenewegen-Clayton (1982) pro-
posal. He argues that opportunity 
cost, not cash outlays, is the variable 
that influences producer decisions 
and resource adjustments. Short-
term negative cash flows may not 
lead to unnecessary adjustment and 
setting prices to cover cash expenses 
may not prevent adjustment. Pasour 
(1983) agrees with Belongia (1983) 
that any effective price support will 
attract additional resources into the 
sector. Pasour (1983) also notes that 
there is no objective basis for deter-
mining an appropriate value for K. 
Regardless of how the value of the 
second term in the formula is deter-
mined, the resulting support price 
will lead to increased prices of land 
or other specialized resources as long 
as it is above the competitive 
equilibrium price. The main point of 
both th~ Belongia (1983) and Pasour 
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(1982) comments is that costs will 
rise to the level of any support price 
regardless of how it is determined as 
long as it is above the long-run 
equilibrium price. 
Groenewegen and Clayton (1983) 
make several points in replying to 
these criticisms. They admit that the 
decision to support prices and the 
mechanisms used to set price levels 
involve value judgments but disagree 
with Pasour (1982) and Belongia 
(1983) who argue that economists 
have nothing to contribute to these 
value decisions. The second point 
concerns the goals underlying price 
supports. Groenewegen and Clayton 
(1982) suggest that the explicit policy 
objective reflected in the formula is 
to stablilize farm incomes, not to 
enhance them as is implied in the 
two comments. Finally, they argue 
that there are policy measures which 
serve as price ceilings. The fact that 
supply shortages will pull stocks in-
to the market keeps prices from ris-
ing as much as they would without 
the programs. As a result, the 
distribution of price expectations is 
truncated at both ends and, if the 
policies are carried out properly, the 
price supports can be set equal to the 
expected price of an untruncated 
distribution. 
The conceptual issues raised in this 
debate have not been resolved. 
There are, nevertheless, several im-
portant notions which can be re-
tained from the discussion. First, the 
existence of specialized resources in 
agriculture means that costs will rise 
to any support level set above the 
market price no matter how that 
level is chosen. Second, the choice of 
decision rules for setting price sup-
ports reflects value judgments that 
include criteria not normally con-
sidered to be part of economics. 
Depending on one's , philosophical 
orientation, there is or is not a role 
for economists in determing the de-
cision rule. A third concept is that 
the levels at which policy prices are 
set should be closely related to the 
underlying policy objectives. Setting 
support prices to protect farm in-
comes may be inconsistent with pro-
moting exports. Discussions of the 
appropriate level for support prices 
are often confusing since the as-
sumed policy objective is not made 
explicit. There are also pratical issues 
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in tying support prices to cost of pro-
duction. In addition to deciding 
what costs to include it is necessary 
to decide which cost structure is ap-
propriate. If support prices are set to 
reflect the average cost of a large 
farm in a low-cost production area, 
they will be seen as too low by many 
farmers. Another question concerns 
the unit for which the costs are com-
puted. The 1981 change from cost 
per bushel to cost per acre removes 
one of the advantages of the cost of 
production approach over the pari-
ty concept. While costs of production 
remain commodity-specific, a per 
acre basis excludes productivity 
changes. 
If the political decision is made to 
use average costs of production as a 
basis for setting policy prices, these 
conceptual and practical questions 
must be resolved through decisions 
on the specific set of computational 
rules to be employed. This will re-
quire prior decisions on the way in 
which the intervention system is ex-
pected to work. For example, target 
prices could be tied to production 
costs while loan rates are set in rela-
tion to world prices. The constraint 
here is that if the target price in-
fluences producer decisions, costs 
will rise to that level and a cost/price 
spiral could develop. This could lead 
to continually increasing deficiency 
payments. Clearly the use of this 
concept does not result in the simple 
application of a universally accepted 
formula which eliminates the 
political aspects of the policy process. 
Policy Prices in Other Countries 
Most industrialized countries have 
instituted policies to support 
agricultural incomes through 
manipulation of prices. These coun-
tries face the same difficulties as the 
United States in determining the 
levels at which to set these prices as 
well as the rules for setting them. 
The following discussion is not in-
tended to be exhaustive and will be 
limited to experiences in three 
economic units: Japan, Canada, and 
the European Community (EC). 
These countries have used pricing 
rules similar to those found in the 
United States. 
Japan 
Agricultural policy in Japan in-
cludes many forms of intervention. 
Rice, the most important food pro-
duct, is under direct state control 
while semi-governmental organiza-
tions are charged with market in-
tervention for pork. In addition to 
using a variety of mechanisms to 
achieve policy goals, .. the intervention 
prices are determined on the basis of 
various principles depending on the 
product. Intervention prices are set 
annually by the government after 
study by commodity-specific govern-
ment councils. The government pur-
chase price for rice is established 
through the use of a cost of produc-
tion formula . Production costs of an 
average rice producer are deter-
mined with family labor valued at 
the average urban wage rate. From 
1960-69 the rice support price rose 
by more than 9 percent per year, due 
largely to increasing urban wages. 
This rapid increase in rice price 
resulted in a surplus. In the 1970's, 
the formula was complemented by 
discretionary support price freezes 
and adjustments (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development, February 1974). 
In the case of wheat and barley, 
the government purchase prices were 
set on the basis of prices in the early 
1950's, adjusted by an agricultural 
parity index. Since government sell-
ing prices were maintained at about 
the same level, the program led to 
large government expenditures in the 
early 1970's. These government costs 
were partially offset since the price 
for imported wheat was below the 
selling price and the government re-
tained the difference. In the case of 
milk, a target price and minimum 
guaranteed price are set for 
manufacturing milk and deficiency 
payments are made. The guaranteed 
producer price is determined on the 
basis of average production costs as 
in the case of rice. For most meats, 
intervention is designed to stabilize 
wholesale prices within limits deter-
mined by past wholesale prices, 
supply and demand considerations, 
and other factors (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1974). These pricing 
rules are clearly similar to those in 
the United States including parity, 
cost of production, and average 
market price approaches to deter-
mining policy prices. 
Canada 
Until 1975, many products were 
covered by a deficiency payment 
system designed to raise final pro-
ducer prices to at least 80 percent of 
the average market price in the 
preceding 10 years. In 1975, the 
period used in averaging market 
prices was shortened to 5 years and 
the minimum percentage raised to 
90 percent. In addition, the 5-year 
average prices were adjusted for 
changes in cash costs over the 5-year 
period. The effect of this change in 
the formula was to raise producer 
prices considerably above what they 
would have been under the old for-
mula, although in 1974-75 market 
prices were high enough to make the 
supports inoperative (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1973, 1978). 
The Canadian Wheat Board con-
trols the marketing of most wheat 
grown in western Canada as well as 
a large proportion of the feed grains 
and oilseeds. During the 1970's, feed 
grain policies were modified to 
maintain the competitiveness of 
grains produced in Western Canada 
with U.S. corn delivered in Eastern 
Canada. By 1976, feed grain policy 
was in place and included a formula 
to determine the Wheat Board price 
for Western feed grains. This for-
mula is based on the relative feeding 
value of Canadian grain and U.S. 
corn as determined by the energy 
and protein content of the grains. 
The unit value of protein and energy 
is computed from the relationship 
between soybean prices and U. S. 
corn prices in Montreal. The objec-
tive of this policy is to determine an 
equal base price for feed grains 
across Canada which will result in 
competitive prices in Eastern 
Canada, a feed grain deficit area 
(Bray, 1978). 
The notion of developing a rel-
ative price structure for grains on the 
basis of their nutritional value in 
livestock feed rations is an approach 
to setting policy''prices which has not 
been used extensively in the United 
States. The advantage of such a 
method is that properly set relative 
prices should lead to better coordina-
tion of supplies and the derived de-
mand for these inputs. Other coun-
tries have also attempted to set sup-
port prices for grains in terms of the 
relative value or need for the output. 
While not related to nutritional 
value, Spain has historically adjusted 
wheat and barley prices to en-
courage or discourage the produc-
tion of these substitute crops in light 
of surpluses or deficits (Peterson, 
et aI., 1983; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1974). 
Other Canadian commodities are 
supported on the basis of formulas. 
Price supports for milk and poultry, 
for example, are established through 
a formula designed to insure a return 
to production resources with ad-
justments for changes in the cost of 
living (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 
1978). During the 1970's these prices 
increased rapidly as a result of 
general inflation. The inclusion of 
changes in cash costs in the formula 
for other commodities based on 
average market prices also leads to 
escalation of the support prices. The 
situation in Canada is somewhat 
peculiar in that prices cannot deviate 
greatly from prices in the United 
States without the implementation 
of extensive trade barriers. In a 
sense, U.S. prices act as a constraint 
on the price support levels set by the 
Canadian authorities. 
The European Community 
Since the EC is made up of 10 in-
dependent nations, setting common 
support prices is more complicated 
than in the United States. Each year 
the Ministers of Agriculture from the 
member states meet to determine the 
amounts by which common prices 
will be increased. All price changes 
are considered together and the en-
tire package must be adopted. In ad-
dition, unanimity is required for the 
final decision so that each state ef-
fectively has veto power over the 
price package. The unanimity prin-
ciple has been maintained in general 
although the 1982 price support 
package was adopted over the objec-
tions of Great Britain. Under these 
conditions, national political in-
terests play an important role in the 
final decision and the annual price 
negotiations can be long and 
controversial. 
The Agricultural Ministers use 
proposals from the EC Agriculture 
Commission as a starting point in 
their price debates. The Commission 
is a kind of multinational civil ser-
vice which has used a variety of 
methods to develop its price pro-
posals. In the mid-1970's, the Com-
mission adopted the "objective 
method" to determine proposed in-
creases. The principle behind this 
method is that prices should be high 
enough to allow modern, efficient 
farms to remain that way. Modern 
farms were defined as those yielding 
income comparable to incomes in 
other sectors. The approach was 
operationalized by studying the cost 
structure of a set of reference farms. 
Using the changes in farm costs over 
a 3-year reference period and the 
changes in nonagricultural incomes, 
the commission computed the need-
ed changes in support prices. An ar-
bitrary figure of 1.5 percent was 
used to correct the results for annual 
productivity changes (Fennell, 
1979). 
As budget problems developed, 
the Commission gradually aban-
doned its objective approach. Pro-
posed price increases have become 
smaller as the expenditures on 
agricultural programs increased 
beyond the budgetary resources of 
the EC. For 1984, the Commission 
proposed price increases averaging 
only 0.8 percent and in 1985 the 
price proposals included reductions 
in prices for cereals and other impor-
tant commodities (Agra Europe, 
1985). It should be emphasized, 
however, that the Agricultural 
Ministers make the final decisions on 
price supports. In general, the Com-
mission's proposals are used as a basis 
for negotiations which often lead to 
much higher price levels. Each 
Minister is under intense political 
pressure from national farm groups 
to obtain the maximum increase. 
Josling and Pearson (1982) have sug-
gested that price support increases 
will generally fall within upper and 
lower limits. The upper limit is the 
price increase which fully compen-
sates all states for inflation in the 
previous year. The lower bound is set . 
by the rule that nominal prices in t:la-
tional currencies cannot decrease in 
-any member state. These limits are 
not explicitly recognized by EC 
legislation but are deduced by Jos-
ling and . Pearson (1982) based on 
past behavior. In the end, the final 
decision on price supports is highly 
political despite efforts by the Com-
mission to use costs or budgetary 
constraints as a means to set policy 
prices. 
Cereal prices have generally been 
increased by the same percentage 
each year, maintaining the initial 
structure of relative prices. Over 
time this relative price structure has 
gotten out of line with grain de-
mand. This situation led to a pro-
posal to set support prices for the 
various cereal grains in relation to 
their nutritional value in livestock 
feed. This is the same notion as is be-
ing used in Canada for feed grains. 
The-approach is referred to as the 
silo-cathedral system and the inten-
tion was to move gradually to a 
structure of relative cereal prices 
consistent with the nutritional value 
of the grains (Knipscheer and Hill, 
1982). In fact, only limited changes 
in the price structure have been 
realized and surplus cereals such as 
soft wheat and barley are still too ex-
pensive, relative to corn, for in-
creased use in livestock feed. 
In general, policymakers in the 
countries reviewed have considered 
the same kinds of approaches to set-
ting policy prices as their counter-
parts in the United States. The one 
new approach is the use of nutri-
tional values to set relative grain sup-
ports. The orgin of this method 
probably lies in the peculiar situa-
tions of the EC and Canada and the 
resulting distortions in relative cereal 
prices. As in the United States, there 
is a tendency for formulas or "objec-
tive" approaches to be abandoned or 
modified in light of political con,. 
siderations, budgetary constraints, 
or policy-included distortions stem-
ming from inconsistencies between 
support prices and basic market 
conditions. . 
Concluding Remarks 
Experience with administered 
agricultural prices in the United 
States and other industrialized coun-
tries reflects the difficulties inherent 
in determining the levels at which to 
set these prices. Formulas and price-
setting rules are seen as ways to limit 
the influence of political infighting 
on the final outcome. However, the 
choice of formula or pricing rule in-
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volves value judgments and requires 
subjective decisions on the way in 
which the rule is to be implemented. 
The review of formal price-setting 
rules shows that it is impossible to 
develop "objective" criteria which 
remove politics from the ad-
ministrative decision. The issue faced 
by policy-makers is to choose be-
tween some form of fixed, automatic 
pricing rule as opposed to discre-
tionary decisions that inevitably in-
volve bargaining among the in-
terested parties. 
The idea of linking agricultural 
support prices to some measure of 
the costs faced by producers has fre-
quently been advanced as a way to 
formalize the process of setting sup-
port prices. A major deficiency of 
this approach is that it neglects de-
mand conditions. The use of average 
market prices or world prices as a 
guide in determining support levels 
overcomes some of the problems of 
basing support prices exclusively on 
some measure of producer costs. 
However, support prices linked to 
market or world prices may be too 
low to protect farm incomes at 
socially acceptable levels. U.S. policy 
provides a way out of this dilemma 
in that deficiency payments can be 
used to attain the income objective, 
while loan rates can be set to reduce 
seasonal price variation and serve as 
a floor in years when market prices 
have a tendency to fall to socially 
unacceptable levels. In setting these 
policy prices, it appears reasonable 
to link the loan rate to average 
market prices while the target price 
could be set in relation to some 
measure of average costs of produc-
tion. The implications of such a for-
malized procedure for determining 
policy prices in the United States are 
explored in Part II. 
PART II: FORMULAS FOR 
LOAN RATES AND 
TARGET PRICES 
The purpose of this section is to ex-
amine the implications of using 
specific formulas to set loan rates and 
target prices. H ypotheticalloan rates 
and target prices are computed for 
the period 1974-84 using formulas 
that link loan rates to season average 
market prices and target prices to 
average costs of production. Com-
puted policy prices are compared 
with the actual loan rates, target 
prices, and market prices observed 
during the 1974-84 period. In the 
absence of a widely accepted method 
for deriving policy price formulas, a 
choice had to be mane from among 
the large number of possibilities. The 
two form ulas selected for this 
analysis have been proposed by other 
writers and will be described in 
detail later . The comparisons are il-
lustrative since many other formulas 
could have been used. Observed 
market prices and cost variables are 
used to calculate the hypothetical 
loan rates and target prices. 
However, if formulas had actually 
been in place during the period con-
sidered, prices and costs would have 
been different from those observed. 
Despite these limitations, the results 
of the exercise are of use in explain-
ing the implications of this type of 
policy. 
Loan Rates 
Setting loan rates in relation to 
market prices constitutes an effort to 
take supply and demand conditions 
into account. It is generally expected 
that the season average market price 
will be above the loan rate. The pur-
pose of the loan rate then becomes 
to eliminate the fall in market price 
which might occur immediately 
after harvest and to serve as a poten-
tial floor in years when market con-
ditions would lead to very low prices 
relative to general price trends. Since 
market prices for the current year 
are not known at the time loan rates 
for that year are announced, the 
most common approach has been to 
use some proportion of a moving 
average of past market prices. 
However, these historical prices may 
not reflect the particular market con-
ditions in a given year. Market prices 
for many crops from 1973-75 were 
higher than the long-term trend. In-
cluding these prices in a moving 
average could result in loan rates in-
consistent with the actual supply and 
demand conditions in subsequent 
years. 
Langley and Price (1985) use a 
simulation model to evaluate several 
loan rate formulas. In comparing 
simple 3- and 5-year moving 
averages of market prices, they note 
that loan rates based on the shorter 
moving average would be less stable 
than with averages based on a longer 
period if crop prices are highly 
variable. This can also be seen in 
Figure 3 where 2-, 3-, and 5-year 
moving average wheat prices are 
plotted along with actual market 
prices. Loan rates based on the 5-
year moving average would not rise 
as high or fall as low as would be the 
case using formulas based on a 
shorter period. If it is expected that 
market prices will continue to be 
highly variable, the longer averag-
ing period is preferable since it 
reduces the variance in the loan rate. 
Following periods of high market 
prices, loan rates set equal to a mov-
ing average of these prices may be 
high enough to attract additional 
resources leading to excessive output. 
To avoid this type of problem, it has 
been suggested that the loan rate be 
set at some proportion of the mov-
ing average. In addition, excluding 
the highest and lowest observations 
would reduce some of the bias in-
troduced by unusually high or low 
prices in previous years. Langley and 
Price (1985) examine the implica-
tions of using alternative proportions 
of a 5-year moving average of 
market prices excluding the high and 
low observations. They project im-
portant economic variables to 1987 
under four sets of assumptions about 
the proportion of the moving 
average used to set loan rates and 
legislated minimum loan rate levels. 
With minimum loan rates set at the 
actual 1984 level, the use of a low 
proportionality factor (75 percent of 
the moving average) results in loan 
rates equal to the minima. Using a 
proportion of 95 percent of the mov-
ing average leads to lower exports 
and greater stock accumulation. 
Their results indicate that a formula 
based on 85 percent of the moving 
average would only interfere with 
the market in exceptional years. 
A major conclusion from the 
analysis presenfed by Langley and 
Price (1985) is that imposing lower 
bounds on the formula-based loan 
rates could impede the operation of 
the pricing rule. They suggest that 
the Secretary of Agriculture should 
have the authority to reduce loan 
rates below the current legislated 
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minima since without that ability 
the constraints on the loan rate for-
mula could render it ineffective. 
With no lower bounds, their results 
show higher export levels and less 
stock accum ulation. However, 
eliminating the minimum loan rates 
could result in greater expenditures 
on deficiency payments if the gap 
between formula-determined loan 
rates and target prices widens 
(Langley and Price, 1985). 
In its proposal for the 1985 Farm 
Bill, the Administration called for 
setting support prices as 75 percent 
of a 3-year moving average of 
market prices. Based on their 
analyses, Langley and Price (1985) 
suggest that such a formula would be 
ineffective if current legislated 
minima are maintained. This con-
clusion is supported by' recent ex-
perience with soybean loan rates. 
These support prices are set as 75 
percent of a 5-year moving average 
of market prices with the high and 
low observations excluded, and a 
legislated minimum level of $5.02 
per bushel. Since 1980, the soybean 
loan rate has been at this lower 
bound. 
To explore the implications of 
using formulas to determine loan 
rates, hypothetical loan rates for 
wheat, corn, cotton, and soybeans 
have been computed using the cur-
rent soybean formula (75 percent of 
a 5-year moving average of market 
prices with high and low observa-
tions deleted), but without lower 
bounds. The results of these calcula-
tions, along with the actual loan 
rates and observed market prices, are 
presented in Figures 4 through 7 and 
Appendix 1. From 1970 to 1974, the 
formula produced loan rates for 
wheat, cotton and corn that were 
below the actual loan rates. The 
unusually high market prices for 
corn and wheat from 1973-75 led to 
sharp increases in the formula-
determined loan rates for these crops 
beginning in 1975. The computed 
loan rate for wheat remained above 
the actual loan rate level until 1979, 
while for corn it was only higher in 
1975 and 1976. Loan rates for cot-
ton computed with the formula were 
below the actual loan rate 
throughout the period covered. 
Market prices for soybeans rose 
rapidly until 1975 and the formula 
loan rate was higher than the actual 
loan rate from 1974 until 1980. 
Farm legislation in 1981 introduced 
this formula to set soybean loan 
rates, but the legislated minimum 
has prevented its application. In re-
cent years, the actual loan rates for 
all four crops have been significant-
ly higher than levels determined by 
using the formula. 
Some further observations can be 
made on the basis of these results. 
First, season average market prices 
during 1970-83 have almost always 
been higher than both the actual and 
computed loan rates. In 1982 and 
9 
1983 the price received for wheat 
was at or below the actual loan rate 
and in 1977 the formula-based 
wheat loan rate was higher than the 
market price. In 2 years, the market 
price for corn was only slightly above 
the actual loan rate. In these cases, 
loan rates may have served as a price 
floor. For the most part, however, 
it appears that actual loan rates have 
served primarily to smooth out 
seasonal price variation and the same 
would have been true of the formula 
loan rates. In all but one case (wheat 
in 1977) , when the formula-
determined loan rate was higher 
than the computed level , market 
prices were still higher than the com-
puted level. Since 1980, the formula 
loan rates would have been much 
lower than the legislated levels 
adopted in the 1981 Farm Bill. 
Another observation to be made in 
this context concerns the movement 
through time of loan rate levels. 
From 1970-83, actual loan rates 
were never reduced from 1 year to 
the next, although in several cases, 
they were left at the same level. The 
strict application of the formula, 
however, allows the loan rate to fall 
as market prices decline. This raises 
questions about the political 
feasibility of applying the formula 
without restrictions. One type of 
restriction is the legislated minimum 
used for soybeans. Another approach 
to this issue would be to set the loan 
rate in year t equal to the loan rate 
in year t-1 if the formula indicated 
a decline in the support level. This 
additional rule would have resulted 
in constant loan rates for wheat and 
corn from 1978-81 , although they 
would generally have been below ac-
tualloan rate levels. Of course, the 
use of these additional rules shelters 
support prices from the full effects of 
market forces , compromising the 
purpose for which the 'formulas are 
designed. 
Target Prices 
Loan rates set as a proportion of 
average market prices may be inade-
quate to insure sufficient income for 
many producers. Variable costs of 
production, total costs of production 
(including a return to land) , actual 
loan rates, and formula-based loan 
rates (from Appendix 1) are 
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presented in Table 1. Actual loan 
rates for wheat, corn, and soybeans 
are greater than the variable costs of 
prodl:lction but generalJy Jess than 
total costs. The formula-based loan 
rates are higher than variable soy-
bean costs but generally lower than 
variable costs of production for 
wheat and corn. Neither loan rate 
covers the variable production cost 
for cotton. If the formula used in the 
preceding section is strictly applied, 
there may be many occasions when 
the loan rate is less than the variable 
costs of production. This situation is 
likely to result in pressure to set 
target prices at levels that will cover 
some measure of production costs. 
As noted in Part I , there are many 
difficulties in using production costs 
to determine administered prices. 
Aside from the conceptual issues 
raised by Belongia (1983) and Pasour 
(1983), perhaps the most intractable 
problem is deciding how to measure 
the costs. Measures of variable costs 
and total costs are presented in 
Tables 2-5. As might be expected, 
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the variation across regions is 
substantial. The national average is 
not indicative of the average costs of 
production in any subregion of the 
United States. In addition to the 
variation acroSS regions, the evolu-
tion through time of the various 
measures presents some anomalies. 
The region with the lowest costs in 
one year may not be the lowest cost 
area in another year. In many cases, 
variable costs decline from one year 
to the next while total costs increase. 
Determining average costs of pro-
duction for wheat is particularly 
complicated since there are several 
types of wheat. The national average 
is approximately equal to a weighted 
average of production costs for hard 
red winter, soft red winter, hard red 
spring, and white wheats. 
There is also substantial variation 
within the regions and within states 
(Table 6). Within Texas, there are 
frequently large differences in pro-
duction costs between irrigated and 
dryland production. The figures in 
Table 6 are weighted averages com-
puted from county and regional 
budget and production statistics. 
Actual target prices for wheat, 
corn, and cotton have been equal to 
or greater than the national average 
variable costs of production. 
However, variable production costs 
in some regions have frequently been 
higher than the target price. In a few 
cases, the target prices have also 
covered the total costs of production, 
either for the United States as a 
whole or for certain regions. The 
loan rate for soybeans (for which 
there is no target price) has been 
greater than the variable costs but 
less than total production costs. 
Figures for actual target prices, 
market prices, and a formula-based 
target price are shown in Appendix 
2 and plotted in Figures 8-11. The 
form ula used to determine the 
hypothetical target prices is the one 
suggested by Groenewegen and 
Clayton (1982). Target prices are 
computed as projected variable costs 
plus some proportion of the dif-
ference between a moving average of 
market prices and a similar moving 
average of variable costs of produc-
tion. For this example, 3-year mov-
ing averages are used and the pro-
portionality factor is 0.5. Since data 
on costs of production are available 
only from 1976, the 1976 target price 
calculations are made on the basis of 
the recorded variable costs for that 
year, rather than an average of the 
preceding 3 years. The 1977 target 
price is based on an average of 
recorded variable costs in 1976 and 
1977. A similar procedure was used 
for 1978 and the exact formula is 
used for the remaining computa-
tions. Variable costs are the national 
averages shown in the tables. 
From 1977-83, the formula-based 
target price for wheat was less than 
both the actual target price and the 
market price. For corn and cotton, 
on the other hand, the form ula 
target price is occasionally higher 
than the actual level but generally 
lower than market prices. The 
formula-based target price for wheat 
would have covered the variable 
costs of production but not total 
costs. The actual target prices for 
wheat, particularly in recent years, 
were much closer to the average total 
costs although generally slightly 
lower. Actual and form ula target 
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TABLE 1. PRODUCTION COSTSt AND LOAN RATES 
U.S. average U.S. average Actual loan Formula loan 
variable costs total costs rate* rate* 
Wheat: 1976 1.91 3.52 2.25 2.32 
($/bu) 1978 1.77 3.29 2.35 2.56 
1980 2.44 4.62 3.00 2.31 
1981 2.76 4.62 3.20 2.37 
1982 2.63 4.47 3.55 2.60 
1983 2.38 4.20 3.65 2.75 
Corn: 1976 1.30 2.15 1.50 1.67 
($/bu) 1978 1.17 1.98 2.00 1.81 
1980 2.02 3.28 2.25 1.73 
1981 1.86 2.82 2.40 1.73 
1982 1.87 2.90 2.55 1.82 
1983 2.62 3.95 2.65 1.92 
Cotton: 1976 42 65 39 29 
(c/bu) 1978 52 77 48 37 
1980 58 95 48 43 
1981 53 78 52 46 
1982 54 78 57 44 
1983 62 92 55 45 
Soybeans: 1976 2.45 5.23 2.50 3.74 
($/bu) 1978 2.52 5.14 4.50 4.55 
1980 3.74 7.56 5.02 4.70 
1981 3.57 6.67 5.02 4.94 
1982 3.38 6.19 5.02 4.74 
1983 4.23 8.29 5.02 4.74 
*From Appendix 1. 
tFor Tables 1-5, data on market prices, actual loan rates, and actual target prices are 
from the series of USDA/ERS publications " Background for 1985 Farm Legislation. " 
Costs of production for 1976-79 are from the U.S. Senate publication and are com-
puted as follows: Variable costs are equal to total, excluding land, less the return to 
management and capital replacement; total costs are the total , excluding land, plus 
the acquisition value of land. From 1980-83, the USDA/ERS publication " Economic 
Indicators of the Farm Sector, Costs of Production" was used. Cash expenses are 
used to represent variable costs; total costs are the variable costs plus net land 
rent, labor (which includes returns to management), and capital replacement. 
prices for corn and cotton cover the 
variable costs of production but both 
are less then the national average 
total costs. For soybeans, the in-
troduction of a formula-based target 
price would result in levels that are 
greater than variable costs but less 
than total costs. 
If formulas are used to determine 
both loan rates and target prices, the 
interesting question concerns the ef-
fects of these policies on deficiency 
payments. The strict application of 
the two formulas examined in this 
report could result in very large defi-
ciency payments since the loan rates 
and target prices set by the formulas 
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are not constrained to move 
together. Maximum potential defi-
ciency payments resulting from the 
use of the two formulas are com-
pared with the actual maximum 
deficiency payments in Table 7. For 
wheat and cotton, the formula-
determined deficiency payments are 
not uniformly larger than the actual 
maximum payments. However, the 
strict application of the two formulas 
for corn would have resulted in 
potential deficiency payments much 
larger than the historical levels. 
Conclusion 
The use of formulas to determine 
administered prices represents an ef-
fort to replace discretionary decisions 
with predictable rules. There are 
both advantages and disadvantages 
to this type of policy approach. The 
use of formulas results in more 
predictable administered prices 
which may prove beneficial in in-
creasing the accuracy qf producer ex-
pectations and consequently their 
ability to make better production 
decisions. It could also be argued 
that linking loan rates to market 
prices and target prices to average 
variable costs of production makes 
these administered prices more con-
sistent with economic conditions. 
This second argument merits fur-
ther discussion. There are many 
possible formulas which could be 
used to set administered prices and 
no real economic criteria to guide 
policymakers in selecting an ap-
propriate formula. Consider the loan 
rate formulas presented by Langley 
and Price (1985). The proportions of 
the moving average used in that 
study were 75 percent, 85 percent, 
and 95 percent. In other discussions 
similar round numbers are usually 
chosen for consideration. Concep-
tually, there is no more reason to 
choose a proportionality factor of 85 
percent than one of 83.67 percent. 
The same is true for other details of 
possible loan rate formulas as well as 
for any form ula based on costs of 
production. The choice of formula , 
thus, is purely arbitrary and it is 
misleading to claim that a particular 
formula is appropriate on the basis 
of economic criteria. 
Another problem with the use of 
formulas is their effectiveness 
through time. It is possible that par-
ticular loan rate and target price for-
mulas would lead to desirable 
market performance over some 
period of time but become inap-
propriate as market conditions 
change. Based on the illustrative ex-
ample used in this report, strict ap-
plication of formula-based loan rate 
and target prices could result in large 
deficiency payments if no additional 
rules are instituted to coordinate the 
movement of these policy prices 
through time. Since it is difficult to 
accurately predict how the variables 
affecting the formulas will evolve, 
their use in setting policy parameters 
should be subject to periodic review. 
TABLE 2. COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR WHEAT, 1976-83 ($/bu) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Region VC* TC* VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U. S. Average 1.91 3.52 1.73 3.17 1.77 3.24 2.01 3.74 
Central Plains* * 1.69 3.36 1.56 2.97 1.52 3.03 1.65 3.30 
Northern Plains* * 1.42 2.66 1.49 2.84 1.52 2.87 2.34 4.29 
Southern Plai ns * * 2.47 4.21 2.07 3.57 2.38 4.06 2.01 3.51 
Southwest* * 2.13 3.57 2.00 3.56 2.11 3.77 2.24 4.04 
Lake states/cornbelt* * * 1.76 3.15 1.48 2.61 1 .. 83 3.46 1.92 3.65 
Northeast* * * 2.32 3.82 2.03 3.44 2.74 4.54 3.12 5.04 
Southeast* * * 1.97 3.17 2.05 3.32 2.42 3.74 2.70 4.18 
Target Price 2.29 2.90 3.40 3.40 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Region VC TC VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 2.44 4.62 2.76 4.62 2.63 4.47 2.38 4.20 
Central Plai ns 1.97 3.91 2.77 4.78 2.33 4.17 1.88 3.63 
Northern Plains 2.66 4.92 2.72 4.41 2.35 4.17 2.26 4.17 
Southern Plains 2.63 4.87 3.25 5.24 3.02 4.98 2.31 4.05 
Southwest 2.54 4.93 3.36 4.89 3.79 5.54 4.06 5.95 
Lake states/cornbelt 2.37 4.55 2.58 4.20 2.71 4.43 2.36 4.08 
Northeast 3.45 6.14 3.53 5.01 3.44 5.38 3.08 4.85 
Southeast 2.89 4.43 2.74 4.06 2.90 4.33 3.07 4.67 
Target Price 3.63 3.81 4.05 4.30 
*VC = variable cost, TC = Total costs (including land). 
* * hard red wi nter wheat. ***soft red winter wheat. 
TABLE 3. COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR CORN, 1976-83 ($/bu) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Region VC* TC* VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 1.30 2.15 1.28 2.13 1.17 1.98 1.27 2.16 
Lake states/cornbelt 1.23 2.10 1.19 2.02 1.08 1.90 1.17 2.09 
Northeast 1.31 1.98 1.38 2.14 1.42 2.14 1.54 2.35 
Northern Plai ns 1.42 2.25 1.33 2.02 1.11 1.87 1.33 2.19 
Southeast 1.58 2.33 2.29 3.37 1.91 2.79 1.82 2.70 
Southwest 1.61 2.56 1.95 2.82 1.73 2.45 1.71 2.45 
Target Price 1.57 2.00 2.10 2.20 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Region VC TC VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average ;1 2.02 3.28 1.86 2.82 1.87 2.90 2.62 3·95 
Lake states/cornbelt 1.87 3.10 1.76 2.70 1.79 2.71 2.58 3.92 
Northeast 2.77 4.05 2.09 2.81 2.07 2.83 2.73 3.76 
Northern Plains 2.09 3.42 1.97 3.04 2.05 3.13 2.44 2.87 
Southeast 3.26 4.71 2.46 3.50 2.07 2.90 3.45 4.74 
Southwest 2.43 3.53 2.20 3.20 2.37 3.53 2.55 3.80 
Target Price 2.35 2.40 2.70 2.86 
*VC = variable costs, TC = total costs (including land). 
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TABLE 4. COST OF PRODUCTION FOR COTTON, 1976-83 (~/lb) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Region VC* TC* VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 42 65 43 59 52 77 49 72 
Delta 52 80 41 63 51 76 49 72 
Southeast 57 80 75 107 61 85 64 96 
Southern Plains 38 62 34 53 47 70 -46 68 
Southwest 35 52 39 58 60 87 51 74 
Target Price 43.2 47.8 52.0 57.7 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Region VC TC VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 58 95 53 78 54 78 62 92 
Delta 63 97 54 78 47 67 62 87 
Southeast 82 119 60 82 50 68 86 117 
Southern Plai ns 64 112 50 74 57 87 56 90 
Southwest 49 77 56 76 60 85 64 92 
Target Price 58.4 70.9 71.0 76.0 
*VC = variable costs, TC = total costs (including land); values have been rounded to the nearest cent. 
TABLE 5. COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR SOYBEANS, 1976-83 ($/bu) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Region VC* TC* VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 2.45 5.23 2.34 4.79 2.52 5.14 2.69 5.31 
Delta 3.15 5.63 3.29 5.83 3.55 6.03 3.45 5.78 
Lake states/cornbelt 2.08 4.99 1.93 4.36 1.98 4.72 2.25 5.08 
Northern Plains 2.78 5.83 1.88 3.95 2.10 4.29 2.08 4.12 
Southeast 3.32 5.42 3.58 6.15 4.13 6.46 3.92 6.20 
Loan rate 2.50 3.50 4.50 4.50 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Region VC TC VC TC VC TC VC TC 
U.S. Average 3.74 7.56 3.57 6.67 3.38 6.19 4.23 8.29 
Delta 5.48 10.34 4.66 7.58 3.92 6.28 4.72 8.14 
Lake states/cornbelt 3.05 6.66 3.18 6.46 3.08 6.10 3.78 8.08 
Northern Plai ns 3.20 6.13 2.91 5.39 2.95 5.52 3.94 7.83 
Southeast 6.62 11.13 4.72 7.43 4.35 6.75 6.30 9.82 
Loan Rate 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 
*VC = variable costs, TC = total costs (including land). 
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TABLE 6. COST OF PRODUCTION IN TEXAS, 1983-84 
Crop 1983 1984 
1. Wheat ($/bu) 
a. dryland 
-variable costs 2.28 2.28 
-tota I costs 3.83 3.94 
b. irrigated 
-variable 4.07 4.47 
-total 5.93 6.31 
2. Corn ($/bu) 
a. dryland 
-variable 1.84 2.38 
-total 2.91 3.76 
b. irrigated 
-variable 2.02 2.38 
-total 2.96 3.37 
3. Cotton ('lib) 
a. dryland 
-variable: high 70 80 
low 30 31 
average 44 45 
-total: high 121 146 
low 61 66 
average 76 82 
b. irrigated 
-variable: high 62 63 
low 32 41 
average 53 55 
-total: high 99 102 
low 62 71 
average 79 82 
4. Soybeans ($/bu) 
-variable 4.60 4.39 
-total 8.38 8.49 
Source: Budgets for Texas Crops and Livestock. 
In the 1981 Farm Bill, loan rates 
and target prices were determined 
for the life of the legislation. There 
is substantial evidence that this pro-
cedure resulted in loan rates incon-
sistent with world demand and 
prices and may have contributed to 
the fall in U. S. exports. This could 
be construed as an argument against 
leaving policy prices to the discretion 
of Congress or policymakers in 
USDA subject to political pressures. 
In reality, this experience with 
discretionary policy prices suggests 
that it is not wise to set prices 3 or 
4 years in advance. In the EC, policy 
prices are set each year by the 
Ministers of Agriculture in a setting 
of political confrontation through a 
process of bargaining subject to con-
straints imposed by the budget. The 
results of this largely discretionary 
procedure have not always been ap-
propriate but support prices have 
been reduced in recent. years. It is 
not inconceivable that a purely 
discretionary process carried out an-
nually would result in policy prices 
that are as effective in achieving 
agricultural policy goals as would be 
the case with formal pricing rules. 
Perhaps the best procedure for 
determining loan rates and target 
prices would include formulas and 
some degree of discretionary authori-
ty. The use of specific formulas 
would bring a degree of predict-
ability that might aid farmers in 
making long-term decisions. At the 
same time, allowing discretionary 
adjustments or revisions of the for-
mulas might be necessary to prevent 
the administered prices from settling 
at levels that are inappropriate from 
a political, budgetary, or some other 
point of view. In a sense, the use of 
formal price-setting rules shifts the 
political confrontation from a debate 
on the levels of administered prices 
to a debate on the formulas to be 
used. Either way, the decisionmak-
ing process is political and this fact 
should be recognized in any effort to 
formalize it. In addition, the types 
of formulas; and discretionary 
allowances that are used can only be 
judged as appropriate in light of the 
underlying policy goals. If export ex-
pansion is an important policy objec-
tive, a different loan rate formula 
might be required than if the objec-
tive is to reduce production to con-
serve soil and water resources. 
Policymakers should make the link 
between basic objectives and for-
malized decisionmaking processes 
explicit. 
Some of the questions raised in this 
report can be explored in greater 
detail with more sophisticated 
modeling approaches. One issue on 
which further research would be 
useful is the link between alternative 
formulas for loan rates and target 
prices. It is possible that specific for-
mulas could be developed to prevent 
too great a divergence between loan 
rates and target prices through time. 
Simulation models incorporating the 
impact of these policy parameters on 
market prices could contribute to a 
greater understanding of the im-
plications of alternative formulas. In 
addition, further research on the ef-
fect of target prices on the costs of 
production is needed in order to 
determine the extent to which an 
escalation of target prices would 
result from tying them to various 
measures of production costs. Final-
ly, alternatives to formal price-
setting rules and purely discretionary 
methods need to be evaluated. For 
example, it might be possible to in-
stitute formal bargaining procedures 
among government, producer, and 
consumer groups as an alternative to 
both the form ulas and current forms 
of discretionary price-setting. Other 
approaches might be developed and 
evaluated in an effort to determine 
the best approach to setting ad-
ministered prices. 
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Figure 8. Actual Target Prices, For-
mula Target Prices, and Market 
Prices for Wheat. 
Figure 9. Actual Target Prices, For-
mula Target Prices, and Market 
Prices for Corn. 
Figure 10. Actual Target Prices, For-
mula Target Prices, and Market 
Prices for Cotton. 
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TABLE 7. ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL MAXIMUM DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
I. Wheat ($/bu) 
A. Computed loan rate* 2.32 2.56 2.56 2.31 
B. Formula target price* 2.87 2.55 2.31 2.45 
C. Potential payment rate* .57 0 0 .14 
D. Actual max. pay. rate* .04 .65 1.05 .90 
E. Potential exposure* 1225 0 0 299 
F. Actual exposure* 86 1330 1865 1921 
II. Corn ($/bu) 
A. Computed loan rate 1.67 1.81 1.81 1.73 
B. Formula target price 2.00 1.92 1.67 1.72 
C. Potential payment rate .33 .11 0 0 
D. Actual max. pay. rate .07 0 .10 .10 
E. Potential exposure 2075 715 0 0 
F. Acutal exposure 440 0 727 793 
III. Cotton ($/Ib) 
A. Computed loan rate 28.79 34.55 36.90 40.32 
B. Formula target price 44.03 48.02 57.00 55.17 
C. Potential payment rate 15.24 13.47 20.10 14.85 
D. Actual max. pay. rate 4.28 3.17 4.00 7.47 
E. Potential exposure 769 923 1038 1036 
F. Actual exposure 216 217 207 521 
IV. Soybeans ($/bu) 
A. Computed loan rate 3.74 4.31 4.55 4.79 
B. Formula price support 4.10 4.20 4.24 4.70 
C. Differences (B-A) .36 -.11 -.31 -.09 
V. Deficiency Payments (million $) 
I E + II E + III E 4069 1638 1038 1335 
I F + II F + III F 742 1547 2799 3235 
Actual deficiency payment 
for the three crops 0 0 1085 619 
Figure 11. Formula Target Prices and 
Market Prices for Soybeans. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
2.31 2.37 2.60 2.74 
3.04 3.50 3.32 2.90 
.73 1.13 .72 .20 
.63 .61 .50 .65 
1738 3147 1991 363 
1500 1699 1383 1573 
1.73 1.73 1.82 1.92 
2.53 2.43 2.37 3.04 
.80 .70 .55 1.12 
.10 0 .15 .21 
5116 5683 4529 4666 
640 0 1235 875 
43.13 46.05 43.60 44.87 
62.75 58.97 59.12 65.75 
19.67 12.92 15.52 20.88 
10.40 18.41 13.92 21.00 
1037 965 884 769 
550 1376 793 774 
4.70 4.94 4.74 4.74 
4.99 5.50 5.03 5.63 
.29 .56 .29 .89 
7891 9795 7404 5798 
2690 3075 3411 3211 
1173 1625 
* A. Computed loan rate : 75 percent of 5-year moving average market prices, high and low excluded . 
B. Formula target price: computed using formula suggested by Groenewegen and Clayton (1982). 
C. Difference between A and B. 
D. Difference between actual loan rates and target prices. 
E. Payment rate (C) multiplied by total production (million $) . 
F. Payment rate (E) multiplied by total production (million $) . 
Source: Backgrou nd for 1985 Farm Legislation. 
17 
REFERENCES 
Agra Europe. Newsletter on Agriculture 
in the European Community. Lon-
don, Various Issues, 1985. 
Belongia, Michael. "Agricultural Price 
Supports and Cost of Production: 
Comment." AlAE, August, 1983. 
Brandow, G.E. "Policy for Commercial 
Agriculture." A Survey of 
Agricultural Economics Literature. 
Vol. 1. Edited by Lee R. Martin, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 
Bray. C.E. Canadian Feed Grain Policy, 
Foreign Agricultural Econ. Report 
No. 144, USDA/ESCS, Washington, 
1978. 
Dernberg, T.F. and J.D. Dernburg. 
Macroeconomic Analysis. Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., Reading, 
Mass. , 1969. 
Fennell, Rosemary. The Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European 
Community, Granada, London, 
1979. 
Grommet , Allen. "Reconciling 
Agricultural Pricing, Environmental, 
Conservation and Structural Con-
cern: Discussion." AlAE. May, 198I. 
Groenewegen, J.R. and K.C. Clayton. 
"Price Supports and Cost of Produc-
tion". AJAE. 1982, pp. 271-275. 
____ . "Price Supports and Cost of 
Production: Reply". AJAE. August, 
1983. 
Hargrove, S.H. The Agriculture and 
Food Act of 1981. Peat Marwick Mit-
chell and Co., 1982. 
Harris, Duane G. "Inflation-Indexed 
Price Supports and Land Values." 
AlAE. August, 1977. 
18 
Holland, F. "The Concept and Use of 
Parity in Agricultural Price and In-
come Policy." Agricultural Food 
Police Review-I. USDA/ERS, 
Washington, 1977. 
Johnson, James, R.W. Rizzi, S.D. Short, 
and R. T. Fulton. Provisions of the 
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981. 
Staff Report, USDA /ERS , 
Washington, 1982. 
Josling, T.E. and S.R. Pearson . 
Developments in the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EC. 
Foreign Ag. Econ. Report 172. 
USDA/ERS, Washington, 1982. 
Knipscheer, H.C. and L. Hill. The De-
mand of Soybean Meal by the Euro-
pean Economic Community: An 
Econometric Model. Ag. Econ. 
Research Report 186, University of Il-
linois, Urbana, Champaign, 1982. 
Langley, James A. and J.M. Price. "Im-
plications of Alternative Moving 
Average Loan Rates. " Agric. 
Economic Report No . 538 , 
ERS/USDA, Washington, 1985. 
Martin, Marshall. Cost of Production: 
The Concept and Some Implications 
for its Use in the Determination of 
Target Prices and Loan Rates. Station 
Bulletin 162, Purdue Univ., West 
Lafayette, 1977. 
__ .. "Reconciling Agricultural Pricing, 
Environment, Conservation, Energy 
and Structural Concerns." AlAE. 
May, 198I. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Agricultural 
Policy in Canada. Paris, 1973. 
__ . Recent Development in Canadian 
Agricultural Policy. Paris, 1978. 
__ . Agricultural Policy in lapan. Paris, 
February 1974. 
__ . Agricultural Policy in Spain. Paris, 
April 1974. 
Pasour, E.C. "Cost of Production: A 
Defensible Basis for Agricultural Price 
Supports?" AlAE. May 1980. 
__ . "Agricultural Price Supports and 
Costs of Production: Comment." 
AlAE. August, 1983. 
Penn, J.B. and W.H. Brown. "Target 
Price and Loan Rate Concepts for 
Agricultural Commodities. " 
Agricultural-Food Policy Review-I. 
USDA/ERS , Washington, 1977. 
Peterson, E. Wesley, A. Pelach, H. 
Riley, and V. Sorenson. Spain 's En-
try Into the EG. Foreign Ag. Econ. 
Report 180 , USDA /ERS , 
Washington, 1983. 
Rasmussen, W .D. and G.L. Baker. Price 
Support and Adiustment Programs 
From 1933 through 1978. Agric. In-
fo . Bulletin 424 , USDA /ERS , 
Washington, 1979. 
Sharples, J .A. and R. Krenz. "Cost of 
Production: A Replacement for Pari-
ty?" Agricultural-Food Policy 
Review-I. USDA/ERS , Washington, 
1977. 
USDA. Agricultural Statistics 1982. U.S. 
Government Printing Office , 
Washington, 1983. 
USDA/ERS. "Background for 1985 Farm 
Legislation: Cotton, Corn, Wheat. " 
Agriculture Information Bulletins 
467, 471, 476. Washington, 1984. 
USDA/ERS. "Economic Indicators of the 
Farm Sector: Costs of Production." 
Washington . 1983 and 1984. 
U. S. Senate. " Costs of Producing 
Selected Crops in the United States." 
Prepared for Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Forestry and Nutrition. 
Washington, various issues. 
APPENDIX 1. MARKET PRICES, ACTUAL LOAN RATES, AND FORMULA LOAN RATES 
Wheat ($/bu) Corn ($/bu) Cotton ($/bu) Soybeans ($/bu) 
Year A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1970 1.33 1.00 1.25 1.33 0.85 1.05 21.86 18.07 20.25 2.85 1.86 2.25 
1971 1.34 0.99 1.25 1.08 0.87 1.05 28.07 16.20 19.50 3.03 1.92 2.25 
1972 1.76 0.98 1.25 1.57 0.83 1.05 27.20 17.32 19.50 4.37 1.94 2.25 
1973 3.95 0.98 1.25 2.55 0.89 1.05 44.40 17.77 19.50 5.68 2.08 2.25 
1974 4.09 1.11 1.37 3.02 1.01 1.10 42.70 19.28 27.06 6.64 2.56 2.25 
1975 3.56 1.76 1.37 2.54 1.36 1.10 51.10 24.49 36.12 4.92 3.27 0 
1976 2.73 2.32 2.25 2.15 1.67 1.50 63.80 28.79 38.92 6.81 3.74 2.50 
1977 2.33 2.56 2.25 2.02 1.81 2.00 52.10 34.55 44.63 5.88 4.31 3.50 
1978 2.97 2.56 2.35 2.25 1.81 2.00 58.10 36.90 48.00 6.66 4.55 4.50 
1979 3.78 2.31 2.50 2.52 1.73 2.10 62.30 40.32 50.23 6.28 4.79 4.50 
1980 3.91 2.31 3.00 3.11 1.73 2.25 74.40 43.13 48.00 7.57 4.70 5.02 
1981 3.65 2.37 3.20 2.50 1.73 2.40 54.00 46.05 52.46 6.04 4.94 5.02 
1982 3.55 2.60 3.55 2.68 1.82 2.55 59.10 43.60 57.08 5.48 4.74 5.02 
1983 3.54 2.75 3.65 3.25 1.92 2.65 66.10 44.87 55.00 7.75 4.74 5.02 
A: season average market price. 
B: loan rate computed as 75 percent of 5-year 1)10ving average, high-and low prices removed. 
C: actual loan rate. 
Data on market prices, actual loan rates, and actual target prices are from a series of USDAiERS publications "Background 
for 1985 Farm Legislation." Costs of production for 1976-79 are from the u.s. Senate publication and are computed as follows: 
variable costs are equal to total, excluding land, less the return to management and capital replacement; total costs are the 
total, excluding land, plus the acquisition value of land. From 1980-83, the USDAiERS publication "Economic Indicators of 
the Farm Sector, Costs of Production" was used. Cash expenses are used to represent variable costs; total costs are the variable 
costs plus net land rent, labor (which includes returns to management), and capital replacement. 
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APPENDIX 2. TARGET PRICES AND MARKET PRICES 
Actual Formula 
Crop/Year Target Price Target Price Market Price 
Wheat ($/bu) J 
1976 2.29 2.89 2.73 
1977 2.90 2.55 2.33 
1978 3.40 2.31 2.97 
1979 3.40 2.45 3.78 
1980 3.63 3.04 3.91 
1981 3.81 3.50 3.65 
1982 4.05 3.32 3.55 
1983 4.30 2.90 3.54 
Corn ($/bu) 
1976 1.57 2.00 2.15 
1977 2.00 1.92 2.02 
1978 2.10 1.67 2.25 
1979 2.20 1.72 2.52 
1980 2.35 2.53 3.11 
1981 2.40 2.43 2.50 
1982 2.70 2.37 2.68 
1983 2.86 3.04 3.25 
Cotton (¢/lb) 
1976 43.2 44.0 63.8 
1977 47.8 48.0 52.1 
1978 52.0 57.0 58.1 
1979 57.7 55.2 62.3 
1980 58.4 62.8 74.4 
1981 70.9 59.0 54.0 
1982 71.0 59.1 59.1 
1983 76.0 65.8 66.1 
Soybeans ($/bu) 
1976 4.10 6.81 
1977 4.20 5.88 
1978 4.24 6.66 
1979 4.70 6.28 
1980 4.99 7.57 
1981 5.50 6.04 
1982 5.03 5.48 
1983 5.63 7.75 
Data on market prices, actual loan rates, and actual target prices are from a series 
of USDA/ERS publications "Background for 1985 Farm Legislation." Costs of produc-
tion for 1976-79 are from the u.s. Senate publication and are computed as follows: 
variable costs are equal to total, excluding land, less the return to management and 
capital replacement; total costs are the total, excluding land, plus the acquisition value 
of land. From 1980-83, the USDAiERS publication "Economic Indicators of the Farm 
Sector, Costs of Production" was used. Cash expenses are used to represent variable 
costs; total costs are the variable costs plus net land rent, labor (which includes returns 
to management), and capital replacement. 
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Mention of a trademark or a proprietary product does not constitute a guarantee or a warranty of the product by The Texas Agricultural 
Experiment Station and does not imply its approval to the exclusion of other products that also may be suitable. 
All programs and information of The Texas Agricultural Experiment Station are available to everyone without regard to race, color, 
religion, sex, age, )1andicap, or national origin. 
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